Move project and host queries into native MCP with host-owned OAuth/context, while retaining memory, skills, actions and publication plugins. Add nearby-model queries and explicit chat/task/learning model defaults. Adopt Responses HTTP/SSE and native steer/queue inbox delivery, preserving scoped session ownership, pending input edits and investigation communication. Disable local-provider discovery: Server /health allowed native vLLM to probe /v1/models on port 8000. A native before/after regression prevents recurrence. Validation: 170 focused Bun tests; service/plugin typechecks; native discovery, provider-discovery and input-inbox smoke checks; no paid model inference.
134 lines
6.1 KiB
TypeScript
134 lines
6.1 KiB
TypeScript
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "bun:test";
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import { mkdtemp, rm } from "node:fs/promises";
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import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
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import { join } from "node:path";
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import type { Request } from "express";
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import {
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attachTrustedAgentContext,
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getLocalAgentContext,
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ProductContextError,
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getTrustedProductCredential,
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isTrustedTaskDispatchRequest,
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} from "../../src/context/localContext.js";
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import { SessionMetadataStore } from "../../src/sessions/metadataStore.js";
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const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch;
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afterEach(() => {
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globalThis.fetch = originalFetch;
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});
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const requestWithHeaders = (headers: Record<string, string>) => ({
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header: (name: string) => headers[name.toLowerCase()],
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}) as Request;
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const authResponse = (userId: string, projectId: string) => ({
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is_superuser: false,
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keycloak_sub: `sub-${userId}`,
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network: "supply",
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permissions: ["analysis:read"],
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project_id: projectId,
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project_role: "member",
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role: "user",
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token_expires_at: "2026-09-17T00:00:00Z",
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user_id: userId,
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username: userId,
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});
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describe("trusted product chat context", () => {
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it("authorizes message dispatch only for verified service accounts with execution permission", async () => {
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const request = requestWithHeaders({ authorization: "Bearer verified", "x-project-id": "project-a" });
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for (const [role, permissions, allowed] of [
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["user", ["operational_task.execute"], false],
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["service", ["operational_task.view"], false],
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["service", ["operational_task.execute"], true],
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["user", [], false],
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] as const) {
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globalThis.fetch = (async () => Response.json({ ...authResponse("actor", "project-a"), role, permissions })) as unknown as typeof fetch;
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await attachTrustedAgentContext(request);
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expect(isTrustedTaskDispatchRequest(request)).toBe(allowed);
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}
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});
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it("verifies personal chats by Bearer without assigning a shared project or business credential", async () => {
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const requests: Array<{ url: string; headers: Headers }> = [];
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globalThis.fetch = (async (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {
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requests.push({ url: String(input), headers: new Headers(init?.headers) });
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return Response.json({ user_id: requests.length === 1 ? "user-a" : "user-b" });
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}) as unknown as typeof fetch;
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const first = requestWithHeaders({ authorization: "Bearer personal-a", "x-agent-local-user": "spoofed" });
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const second = requestWithHeaders({ authorization: "Bearer personal-b" });
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await attachTrustedAgentContext(first);
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await attachTrustedAgentContext(second);
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expect(requests[0]!.url).toEndWith("/api/v1/access-context");
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expect(requests[0]!.headers.has("X-Project-Id")).toBeFalse();
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expect(getLocalAgentContext(first).userId).toBe("user-a");
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expect(getLocalAgentContext(first).projectId).toBeUndefined();
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expect(getLocalAgentContext(first).projectKey).not.toBe(getLocalAgentContext(second).projectKey);
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expect(getTrustedProductCredential(first)).toBeNull();
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});
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it("does not turn a project header or expired personal token into anonymous access", async () => {
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globalThis.fetch = (async () => Response.json({ detail: "expired" }, { status: 401 })) as unknown as typeof fetch;
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await expect(attachTrustedAgentContext(requestWithHeaders({ "x-project-id": "project-a" }))).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ProductContextError);
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await expect(attachTrustedAgentContext(requestWithHeaders({ authorization: "Bearer expired-personal" }))).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ProductContextError);
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});
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it("uses verified product users and projects instead of spoofable local headers", async () => {
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const identities = [authResponse("product-user-1", "project-1"), authResponse("product-user-2", "project-2")];
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globalThis.fetch = (async () => Response.json(identities.shift())) as unknown as typeof fetch;
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const first = requestWithHeaders({
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authorization: "Bearer product-token-1",
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"x-project-id": "project-1",
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"x-agent-local-user": "spoofed-user",
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"x-agent-local-project": "spoofed-project",
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});
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const second = requestWithHeaders({
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authorization: "Bearer product-token-2",
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"x-project-id": "project-2",
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"x-agent-local-user": "spoofed-user",
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"x-agent-local-project": "spoofed-project",
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});
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await attachTrustedAgentContext(first);
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await attachTrustedAgentContext(second);
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const firstContext = getLocalAgentContext(first);
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const secondContext = getLocalAgentContext(second);
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expect(firstContext.userId).toBe("product-user-1");
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expect(firstContext.projectId).toBe("project-1");
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expect(secondContext.userId).toBe("product-user-2");
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expect(secondContext.projectId).toBe("project-2");
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expect(firstContext.actorKey).not.toBe(secondContext.actorKey);
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expect(firstContext.projectKey).not.toBe(secondContext.projectKey);
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const localSpoof = requestWithHeaders({
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"x-agent-local-user": "product-user-1",
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"x-agent-local-project": "project-1",
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});
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await attachTrustedAgentContext(localSpoof);
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const localContext = getLocalAgentContext(localSpoof);
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expect(localContext.actorKey).not.toBe(firstContext.actorKey);
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expect(localContext.projectKey).not.toBe(firstContext.projectKey);
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const tempDir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "tjwater-product-session-"));
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try {
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const store = new SessionMetadataStore(tempDir);
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await store.initialize();
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await store.ensure({ ...firstContext, sessionId: "private-session" });
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expect(await store.get(secondContext, "private-session")).toBeNull();
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expect((await store.get(firstContext, "private-session"))?.sessionId).toBe("private-session");
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} finally {
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await rm(tempDir, { force: true, recursive: true });
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}
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});
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it("fails closed when any supplied product credential cannot be verified", async () => {
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globalThis.fetch = (async () => Response.json({ detail: "expired" }, { status: 401 })) as unknown as typeof fetch;
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const request = requestWithHeaders({
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authorization: "Bearer expired-token",
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"x-project-id": "project-1",
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});
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expect(attachTrustedAgentContext(request)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ProductContextError);
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});
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});
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